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ABSTRACT 
 
 In the last few decades, the field of cultural psychology has received increasing attention 
due to the recognition that individual actions and thoughts are guided by more than one’s 
biology. Layering in the cultural context in which people exist has enriched our understanding of 
the human psyche but has also raised questions about the origins of cultural differences. This 
thesis explores one possible explanation, namely the historical subsistence style of a region. In 
the most basic sense, subsistence style refers to the way we used to eat, whether it be farming, 
herding, or hunting, and some cultural psychologists have found evidence suggesting that 
subsistence styles – even if they are no longer practiced – continue to shape contemporary 
cultures and their conceptions of morality. This thesis evaluates the theoretical underpinnings of 
Subsistence Style Theory and extrapolates its implications to moral attitudes and norms, 
including human rights, upheld by various cultures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For my senior honors thesis, I wanted to connect the academic interests that have shaped 
my time at Penn, ranging from moral psychology to global human rights, and explore their 
intersection vis-à-vis culture. In particular, I was driven by the question, “Why do moral norms 
and attitudes vary by culture?” In the Obedience capstone taught by Professor Royzman, we 
debated whether or not Adolf Eichmann, a high-ranking Nazi SS officer, was wickedly evil in 
nature or simply complying with the norms of his environment. Philosopher Hannah Arendt has 
famously argued for the latter perspective using the term “banality of evil,” which describes the 
capacity for destructive obedience that exists in all of us and can materialize under specific 
circumstances.1 According to Arendt’s theory, Eichmann’s actions were culturally influenced – 
in the culture fostered by the Nazi regime, ordinary people without sadistic or anti-Semitic 
tendencies were able to commit extraordinary crimes against humanity.  
The debate between nature and nurture emerged in my human rights courses as well. Are 
human rights universal or culturally-determined? The history and practice of human rights 
suggest the latter, or at least that if there are universally-recognized rights, cultures support and 
enforce them differently. The most notable distinction is between Western and Eastern countries 
and their preferential support for political and civil rights and economic, social, and cultural 
rights, respectively. In the “West,” referring to developed, wealthy, and individualistic countries, 
political and civil rights such as the right to a fair trial and to free speech are considered more 
important than economic, social, cultural rights such as the right to healthcare and to adequate 
housing. The trend is flipped for Eastern countries who are typically developing, collectivistic, or 
both. 
                                                     
1 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (München: Piper, 1964).  
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With the understanding that human rights are moral claims that aim to set the minimum 
standard of decent and dignified life, human rights are necessarily a category of moral norms. 
Thus, if conceptions of morality differ across cultures then it follows that those of human rights 
are also culturally-determined. Essentially, this speculation is reflective of the moral 
universalism vs. relativism debate which is ongoing and contentious. This thesis presumes that 
morality, at least in some part, is shaped by culture and examines this complex part of human 
psychology through a cultural lens in order to assess a possible explanation for the cultural 
differences in morality and by extension human rights.   
 The objective of this thesis is not to add new knowledge to the relevant disciplines; 
rather, it is to connect the insights from existing literature and research on cultural orientations, 
subsistence style theories, and notions of morality. By doing so, I hope to shed light on an 
interesting, albeit obscure, perspective on the causal mechanisms behind contemporary cultures 
and their manifestations in moral attitudes and behaviors. I do not make grandiose claims or 
predictions about cultures around the world, how they will change in the future, and what that 
implies for the conception of morality. Instead, I offer criticisms and alternative explanations for 
every theory I discuss, caveats to the disciplines and premises that guide this thesis, and a 
philosophical discussion at the end to invoke thoughtful and inquisitive reflection on the part of 
the reader.   
 Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for the thesis, providing an overview of the role of culture 
in shaping individual and collective psychology. Chapter 2 discusses two theories that support 
Subsistence Style Theory, which offers a possible and/or partial explanation for cultural 
differences. Finally, Chapter 3 attempts to answer the question “so what?” by exploring the 
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human rights implications of cultural orientations that have evolved from historical subsistence 
styles.    
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CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN SHAPING PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 Culture is critical to virtually every aspect of society, shaping institutions, ideas, and 
behaviors of humankind. Social theorists and anthropologists understand culture as a dynamic 
force that is not only an inner state (feelings and experience) but also a vehicle for commitments, 
utterances, and actions – a view known as the “subjective-behavioral approach.”2 According to 
cultural sociologist Ann Swidler, culture shapes behavior by providing a repertoire of habits, 
styles, and skills upon which people rely to operate, and it also consists of meaningful constructs 
such as beliefs, rituals, art forms, language, and stories.3 Richard Shweder, a cultural 
anthropologist, highlights that culture is constructed and inherited by members of a community, 
the boundaries of which need not be national or ethnic.4 A differentiated and legitimate culture 
can exist for any community whose members share key beliefs and behaviors. Despite their core 
similarity, however, various subgroups and individuals within a culture can still vary in 
meaningful and large ways.5 
 This thesis embraces the above understanding of culture and is primarily concerned with 
the dimension of culture that includes norms and rules that regulate and promote certain human 
activities and thoughts. To better understand the ways in which culture (external influence) can 
shape psychology (internal influence), including morality, a closer look at cultural psychology 
and moral psychology is warranted.  
 
                                                     
2 Wuthnow, Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis, (1987). 
3 Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” American Sociological Review, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 273, 
(1986).  
4 Schweder et al., “The Cultural Psychology of Development: One Mind, Many Mentalities.” Handbook off Child 
Psychology: Theoretical Models Of Human Development, (2006).  
5 Jensen, “Different worldviews, different morals: America’s culture war divide.” Human Development, vol. 40, pp. 
325-344, (1997); Turiel, The culture of morality, (2002). 
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1.1 Cultural Psychology 
 Cultural psychology is the study of how cultures reflect and shape the psychological 
processes of their members – it contextualizes individual psychology through the lens of social 
practices and ideas. While some cultural psychologists, such as cross-cultural psychologists, 
search for psychological processes that are universal, others compare differences in thought 
patterns and behaviors within and across cultures. The field emerged in response to Western 
psychologists’ failure to replicate laboratory findings in non-Western settings, a phenomenon 
that supported Shweder’s theory that the psyche and culture are mutually constructed and 
inseparable.6 Therefore, Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (W.E.I.R.D.) 
populations, who were overrepresented in psychological research, could no longer be considered 
the universal standard for human behaviors and thoughts.7 Indeed, psychologists are increasingly 
discovering that core values and cognitive processes can vary greatly across cultures and that 
these more-informed findings can better explain and predict people’s behaviors and thoughts.  
 The following theories and research in this thesis assume that cultures are inherited from 
past generations yet dynamic, continually adapting to potential changes in the demographic, 
ecology, and economy of regions.  
 
1.2 Sociocultural Ecologies: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft  
 In 1887, German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies proposed the theoretical constructs of 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, meaning “community” and “society,” respectively. 
Gemeinschaft environments are rural, small-scale, low-tech, homogenous, and relatively self-
contained communities, whereas Gesellschaft environments are urban, large-scale, high-tech, 
                                                     
6 Shweder, Thinking Through Cultures, (1991).  
7 Henrich et al., “The Weirdest People in the World?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 33, no. 2-3, pp.61-83, 
(2010). 
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heterogeneous, and permeable societies.8 These concepts have been studied and further 
elaborated upon by scholars and researchers, including anthropologist Robert Redfield whose 
1941 research compared folk society (Gemeinschaft) with urban society (Gesellschaft). The two 
prototypes have emerged as important starting points for psychologist Patricia Greenfield’s 
theory of social change, which explains and predicts how culture transforms as social, ecological, 
and demographic conditions change.9 This thesis focuses on one of these conditions – 
subsistence style – and explores its impact on culture in Chapter 2. 
According to Greenfield’s theory, there is a causal relationship between 
sociodemographic characteristics and cultural values, and so Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
necessarily have different developmental pathways, as shown in the figure below.10 Though 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft seemingly represent a sociological and ecological dichotomy, 
many environments, at various points in their development, fall somewhere in between. Thus, 
the contrasting prototypes serve as only the “outer limits” of a continuum of environments along 
which various regions can be placed. They provide a loose framework for understanding and 
predicting a region’s process of change or current phase in its developmental pathway based on 
its degree of similarity to either prototype.11 For example, a Mexican town Redfield observed for 
his research exhibited a few but key Gemeinschaft characteristics, so he predicted it follow a 
Gemeinschaft pathway but only generally.  
                                                     
8 Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, (1887). 
9 Greenfield, “Linking Social Change and Developmental Change.” Developmental Psychology, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 
401-418, (2009). 
10 Abels et al., “Early socialization contexts and social experiences of infants in rural and urban Gujarat, India.” 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, vol. 36, no. 6, pp. 717-739, (2005).; Keller, Cultures of infancy, (2007).  
11 Loomis et al., “The application of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as related to other typologies.” Gemeinschaft 
und Gesellschaft, pp. 12-29, (1957.) 
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 Redfield’s research findings corroborate the theory of social change in which 
sociodemographic variables influence cultural values. In the indigenous village of Tusik, which 
largely mirrored the Gemeinschaft prototype, social relations were lifelong and highly 
interdependent – the institution of divorce did not exist and married couples were permanently 
connected to their spouse’s kin.12 Virtually everyone in Tusik relied on subsistence agriculture 
based on growing corn. On the other hand, in the city of Mérida, which was closer to 
Gesellschaft in terms of social complexity, kin relations were less enduring than those in Tusik 
as divorces and marital desertion were relatively common.13 Instead of a subsistence economy, 
the people of Mérida lived by commercial activity, including trading commodities, 
manufacturing goods, or providing services. Given these differences, Tusik and Mérida were 
                                                     
12 Redfield, The folk culture of Yucatán, (1941). 
13 Ibid. 
Ecology rural urban
small scale large scale
simple, low division of labor complex, differentiated economic roles
low technology high technology
low literacy high literacy
internal homogeneity internal heterogeneity
relatively self-contained regular contact with outside world
Economy subsistence activities commerce, involving money
poorer wealthier
Relationships lifelong, interdependent kin fleeting, independent strangers
Psych. Variants interdependence independence
Gemeinschaft (community) Gesellschaft (society)Sociodemographics
Cultural Values Collectivism Individualism
Figure 1. The double-sided horizontal arrows indicate that the variables are multivalued dimensions rather than binary concepts. The vertical 
arrows indicate dominant causal relations. Adapted from Patricia Greenfield's model of social and developmental change (2009). 
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predicted to follow different pathways and thus develop different cultural values, characteristic 
of collectivism and individualism, respectively. 
 
1.3 Cultural Orientations: Collectivism and Individualism 
 Cross-cultural psychologist Harry Triandis explains that collectivism and individualism 
describe the theme around which cultures, including shared norms, cognitive styles, and 
practices, are organized.14 Specifically, the theme for collectivism is connection and for 
individualism is autonomy. Interdependence and independence represent psychological variants 
of collectivism and individualism, respectively. They are based on contrasting construals of the 
self and of others – in collectivistic cultures, the emphasis is on attending to others, fitting in, and 
maintaining harmonious interdependence within the community; in individualistic cultures, 
people seek to maintain their independence by attending to the self and expressing unique inner 
attributes.15 Triandis points out that, similar to Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, collectivism and 
individualism serve as useful theoretical constructs that can link and explain a variety of different 
behaviors around the world. For this reason, they form the basis of many studies and debates in 
disciplines such as philosophy, history, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. 
 In terms of how these two orientations manifest, a 2011 study showed that in people in 
individualistic cultures such as the U.S. think of themselves as “independent,” “equal,” and 
consistent across time and situations, whereas those in collectivistic cultures such as Japan think 
of themselves in relation to their communities and situations, using descriptors like 
“considerate,” “father,” and “daughter.”16 However, the cultures of the U.S. and Japan are 
                                                     
14 Triandis, Individualism and Collectivism, (1995). 
15 Markus et al., “Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation.” Psychological 
Review, vol. 98, no. 2, pp. 224-253, (1991). 
16 Heine, Cultural Psychology, (2011). 
 13 
 
dynamic and vary within each country. For example, over time Japan has become more 
individualistic, adapting to changes in sociodemographic variables such as its economy.17 
Collectivism and individualism can also describe the social adaptations to Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft environments.18 Collectivistic qualities, such as enduring relationships with 
extended relatives, are supported by the practices and norms of Gemeinschaft environments. 
Individualistic values, such as the importance of privacy, are correlated with Gesellschaft 
environments. Greenfield’s review of empirical research revealed that, through adaptive 
processes, movement of any ecological variable in a Gesellschaft direction shifts cultural values 
in an individualistic direction, encouraging more independent social behavior and more abstract 
cognition. In contrast, ecological changes toward a Gemeinschaft direction are likely to move 
cultural values and the developmental pathway toward collectivism.19 Thus, much like the 
spectrum anchored by Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, individualism and collectivism also serve 
as endpoints of a continuum rather than as dichotomous labels. Even mostly individualistic 
cultures will have some collectivistic traits, and vice-versa.  
 
1.4 Criticisms and Vulnerabilities  
  As with every field of psychology, cultural psychology is not without its pitfalls. 
Psychologist Per Gjerde stated that the field “generalizes human development across nations and 
continents” and promotes a disregard for the heterogeneity of individuals within a culture as well 
as for the nuances across similar ones.20  
                                                     
17 Miyanaga, The creative edge: Emerging individualism in Japan, (1991). 
18 Markus et al., “Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation.”  
19 Greenfield, “Linking Social Change and Developmental Change.”  
20 McNulty, "Emphasis on 'culture' in psychology fuels stereotypes, scholar says." AScribe, (2004). 
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Cultural Universalism. In the 1960s, psychological and cultural universalism was the 
popular view, regarding human groups as fundamentally similar in both psychology and culture. 
While there are apparent, undeniable differences across cultures, such as race and language, 
universalists believe that there are some values, behaviors, thoughts, and rights that exist in every 
human culture. Opposite to this view is cultural relativism, which argues that everything is 
culturally constructed and thus varies across different cultures. Relativists believe that values, 
including moral principles and norms, are culturally dependent and that there are no fundamental 
truths. This debate has been particularly salient in human rights discourse, given it aims to define 
and enforce rights and norms that should be afforded to every human. Where the fault lines of 
cultures are and what constitutes as universal are still debated upon, and this thesis does not 
endorse one view absolutely or wholly, even though subsequent discussions necessarily accept 
some degree of relativism as the premise.     
Dichotomizing Cultures and Individuals. Dichotomizing cultures minimizes important 
within-group variability and within-person complexity.21 Reliance on concepts such as 
Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, collectivism-individualism, and interdependence-independence – 
even with the cautionary note that they exist on a spectrum – can promote faulty labeling of 
cultures as strictly one or the other. This variability and complexity are crucial to acknowledge, 
especially when the geographical unit of analysis in cultural research is continents or larger; for 
example, a theory discussed in Chapter 2 contrasts a Chinese province that is surprisingly 
individualistic with a neighboring one that is more predictably collectivistic.22 At the same time, 
these theoretical anchor points are useful to generally situate various cultures and their 
                                                     
21 Rogoff, The cultural nature of human development, (2003); Smetana, “On heterogeneity, coexistence, and 
development within cultures: Commentary on Catherine Raeff’s “Multiple and inseparable: Conceptualizing the 
development of independence and interdependence.” Human Development, vol. 49, no. 2, pp, 129-134, (2006). 
22 Talhelm et al., “Large-Scale Psychological Differences Within China Explained by Rice Versus Wheat 
Agriculture.” Science, (2014). 
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arrangement at a specific moment in time, allowing researchers to better describe and predict 
tendencies and values of individuals as well as of whole communities.  
Stereotyping. Stereotypes arise from the blanket generalizations that dichotomies 
promote. Researchers most commonly juxtapose the East with the West, a dichotomy that can 
serve as a baseline heuristic but also confer a sense of inferiority or negative biases on others 
along sociographic lines such as race. Ironically, while stereotypes acknowledge individuals in 
relation to their environments, they can undermine the entire purpose of cultural psychology by 
seeing people as homogenous products of culture.  
Methodology. The methodology of many cultural studies has also been scrutinized for its 
reliance on self-reported data. Though self-reporting data is one of the most accessible and 
practical methods of mass data collection, particularly in cultural studies, it is vulnerable to 
errors and biases that bring the validity and reliability of subsequent analyses into question. 
Attitudes do not always correspond to behavior, and even when they do, participants may not be 
adequately self-aware or choose to lie, especially on sensitive topics such as torture. Participants 
can also interpret questions and answer choices differently; for example, a trait like “tolerance” 
is vaguely and variously defined and a self-reported “6” on a scale of 7 can mean another 
person’s “4.” These criticisms and dangers of cultural psychology are important to keep in mind 
for theories and frameworks discussed in subsequent chapters and form the basis of evaluations 
and critiques that follow.  
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CHAPTER 2: SUBSISTENCE STYLE THEORY 
 
 Subsistence style is both an economic and social system, characterized by the circulation 
of goods, services, and other processes that support and maintain a community.23 This system, 
sometimes referred to as “seasonal, integrated economy,” follows the seasonal cycle of available 
resources and includes activities such as hunting, fishing, gathering, and trapping, which in turn 
provide subsistence goods such as food, heat, clothing, shelter that are necessary for the 
continued survival of the community.24 The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, a multinational NGO 
representing indigenous peoples inhabiting the Arctic regions (Inuits), defines subsistence as “a 
highly complex notion that includes vital economic, social, cultural and spiritual dimensions,” 
meaning “much more than mere survival or minimum living standards.”25  
Sometimes, the term “subsistence” is used to negatively imply primitive ways of life in 
rural or older communities in the developing world. Some scholars have also drawn a sharp 
distinction between subsistence economy and market economy, considering the former to be an 
inferior, outdated mode of economic organization that should be replaced by the latter, a more 
complex and global capitalist system. In this thesis, however, “subsistence styles” exclusively 
refer to the various food production systems that communities relied on for sustenance, such as 
farming and herding.  
Subsistence Style Theory argues that some forms of subsistence require and cultivate 
more functional interdependence than other forms.  The most common comparison in 
subsistence style research has been between herding and farming, which vary significantly in 
                                                     
23 Kuokkanen, “Indigenous Economies, Theories of Subsistence, and Women.” American Indian Quarterly, vol. 35, 
no. 2, (2011). 
24 Elias, Northern Aboriginal Communities: Economies and Development, (1995). 
25 Various, Principles and Elements for a Comprehensive Arctic Policy (1992).  
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levels of mobility, labor, and self-sufficiency. Herders can move more freely and independently 
given their form of subsistence is animals and they are also usually only responsible for their 
own herds. In contrast, farmers are more anchored to their work, given that crops are rooted to 
the land, and their work is typically more laborious. Subsistence Style Theory contends that, 
because of these differences, herding cultures are more individualistic and farming cultures are 
more collectivistic.  
 The two theories discussed in this chapter – Rice Theory of Culture and Culture of Honor 
Theory – explore the impact of subsistence style vis-à-vis type of farming (rice or wheat) and 
herding, respectively.  
 
2.1 Rice Theory of Culture: Diverging Legacies of Rice and Wheat 
 A 2014 cross-cultural study of Chinese provinces revealed that historical agricultural 
practices impact the cultural orientations we see today, even long after those subsistence styles 
have disappeared. Psychologists Talhelm, Zhang, Oishi, Shimin, Duan, Lan, Kitayama (Talhelm 
et al.) discovered that a history of farming rice cultivates more interdependent cultures whereas a 
history of farming wheat produces more independent cultures. This theory, termed the Rice 
Theory of Culture, is an extension of Subsistence Style Theory in that it explores beyond the 
mainstream herding-farming research and delves further into specific types of farming, namely 
of rice and wheat. 
 The researchers chose to compare the effects of farming rice and wheat because they are 
two of the most common subsistence crops yet differ greatly in how they are grown. Specifically, 
the different levels of irrigation and labor required for farming rice vs. farming wheat have been 
 18 
 
suggested as possible explanations for the cultural differences between the rice regions and 
wheat regions.  
 Rice. Farming rice requires a high level of irrigation because rice paddies need standing 
water. To facilitate adequate irrigation, rice farmers need to build and rely on elaborate irrigation 
systems that stretch over multiple farms. These irrigation networks are intensely laborious to 
build, dredge, and drain, so entire communities, rather than individual farmers, are typically 
expected to contribute and collaborate. The need for collaboration continues even after the 
irrigation networks are set up – one farmer’s water use can affect his or her neighbors’ ability to 
irrigate their farms, so rice farmers have to continually coordinate their water usage.    
 The relative labor intensiveness of growing paddy rice (“rough rice”) has also been well 
documented. Agricultural anthropologists visiting pre-modern China have estimated that farming 
paddy rice requires at least twice the number of hours as it takes to grow wheat. A Chinese 
farming guide in the 1600s recommended that people grow wheat instead of rice if there is 
limited availability of labor.26 Therefore, to supply the requisite amount of labor for paddy rice, 
farmers form cooperative labor exchanges, which entail staggering the families’ planting dates 
and thus the harvesting periods such that families can help with each other’s fields.27 Expectedly, 
farmers rely most heavily on these labor exchanges during transplanting and harvesting, 
processes that are particularly labor intensive.  
 Thus, the logic of cooperation underpinning the Rice Theory of Culture is based on 
economics and reason, not on the outstanding moral goodness of rice farmers. Cooperative 
behavior is economically beneficial and necessary even for the farmers and so they are 
                                                     
26 Elvin, The Chinese Agricultural Economy, (1982). 
27 Bray, The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies (1986).  
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conditioned to form relationships of trust and reciprocity with each other and to avoid behaviors 
that may threaten these connections.  
 Wheat. Compared to farming rice, wheat is much easier to grow. Farming wheat does not 
require irrigation beyond natural rainfall, and as mentioned, needs only half of the manpower 
required for paddy rice farming, even during transplanting and harvesting periods. The relative 
ease in growing wheat allows farmers to work on and worry about their own plots and not have 
to systematically exchange help with others.  
 The Study. The study tested 1162 Han Chinese students from six regions: Beijing, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Liaoning. The Yangtze River, which runs horizontally 
through mainland China, splits the wheat-growing north from the rice-growing south. The 
regional difference in the type of farming stems in part from the differing ecological conditions 
created by the river whose basin is home to nearly one-third of the country’s population, and as 
such, played a crucial role in shaping the country’s agricultural history.28 Per the hypothesis 
behind the Rice Theory of Culture, researchers predicted the southern and eastern regions to be 
most interdependent due to their flat floodplains which are ideal for growing rice. 
 The prevalence of rice farming in each region was measured using statistical yearbook 
data on the percentage of cultivated land in each province devoted to rice paddies. Provinces 
with more than 50% of farmland devoted to rice paddies were categorized as “rice provinces” in 
this study; those with less than 50% of land devoted rice paddies were considered “wheat 
provinces.” To control for recent technological innovations in farming, the researchers analyzed 
rice farming data from the past, starting in 1996 which is the oldest data provided by the Bureau 
of Statistics. 
                                                     
28 World Wild Life, “Yangtze.” Web.  
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 Degrees of individualism and collectivism in these cultures were determined through 
measuring cultural thought, implicit individualism, and loyalty/nepotism. These measures were 
designed and chosen specifically to avoid the bias that typically results from self-report scales. 
 Cultural Thought Style. Cultural thought was the main dependent variable of the study 
and measured through the triad task. The triad task entails asking participants to pair two out of 
three related objects, such as train, bus, and tracks. Two items belong to the same abstract 
category (train and bus belong to the category “tracks”), and two share a functional relationship 
(train runs on tracks). The idea behind this task is that individuals from individualistic cultures 
are more likely to choose abstract pairings, which implies analytic thinking style, whereas people 
from collectivistic cultures are more likely to choose relationship pairings, which connotes 
holistic thinking style.29 Researchers found that people from provinces with a higher percentage 
of farmland devoted to rice paddies indeed think more holistically, even when neighboring 
counties were compared to control for other geographic confounds.  
 Implicit Individualism. Implicit individualism was measured through the sociogram task, 
which involves asking participants to draw a diagram of their social network using circles to 
represent themselves and their friends.30 A bigger drawing of oneself relative to representations 
of others indicates self-inflation, which suggests a higher sense of individualism. A prior study 
found that Americans tend to self-inflate, meaning draw themselves bigger, by about 6 
millimeters, and Europeans by 3.5 millimeters. In contrast, Japanese participants tend to slightly 
self-deflate, meaning draw themselves smaller than how they would draw their friends. 
According to the Rice Theory, people from rice provinces should be more likely to self-deflate, 
                                                     
29 Ji et al., “Is it culture of is it language? Examination of language effects in cross-cultural research on 
categorization.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 57-65, (2004). 
30 Kitayama et al., “A Cultural Task Analysis of Implicit Independence: comparing North America, Western Europe, 
and East Asia.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 236-255 (2009).  
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and people from wheat provinces should self-inflate more. Talhelm et al. conducted the 
sociogram task and confirmed this prediction – people from rice provinces are more likely to 
draw themselves smaller than they drew their friends, and people from wheat provinces tend to 
self-inflate by about 1.5 millimeters.     
 Loyalty/Nepotism. Loyalty/nepotism was measured based on how differently people treat 
their friends versus strangers. People in collectivistic cultures are thought to draw a sharp 
distinction between friends and strangers.31 This potential difference in treatment was tested in a 
prior study by having participants envision entering a business deal with an honest friend, a 
dishonest friend, an honest stranger, and a dishonest stranger.32 All the scenarios are set up such 
that dishonesty of either friend or stranger causes the participant to lose money in the deal and 
that honesty of the business partner allows the participant to earn money. In each case, 
participants have a chance to use their own money to reward or punish their partner for their 
honesty or lack thereof. Preference towards rewarding rather than punishing friends can be 
construed positively as loyalty or negatively as nepotism, depending on one’s perspective.  
The same study found that Singaporean participants reward their friends much more than 
they punish them, whereas American participants are more likely to punish their friends for 
dishonest behavior. The findings of this study confirm the hypothesis that collectivistic cultures 
tend to punish friends less than individualistic cultures. Talhelm et al. sought to test if this 
applied to rice and wheat provinces as well, and found that people from rice provinces are indeed 
more likely than those from wheat provinces to show loyalty or nepotism towards their friends. 
People from rice and wheat provinces did not differ on how they treated business partners who 
were strangers, strengthening the validity of the results. 
                                                     
31 Triandis, Individualism and Collectivism, (1995). 
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Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 47, no. 6, pp. 1295-1299 (2011).  
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 These three measures – cultural thought style, implicit individualism, and 
loyalty/nepotism – support the claim that rice provinces are more holistic thinking, 
interdependent, and loyal/nepotistic than wheat provinces. However, given that all the 
participants were college students, Talhelm et al. additionally tested for divorce rates and patents 
for inventions – variables linked to higher individualism – to determine whether the cultural 
differences of rice and wheat regions extended beyond young adults. 
 Divorce Rates. A prior study showed that individualistic countries have higher divorce 
rates than collectivistic countries after controlling for GDP per capita.33 The logic is that since 
collectivistic cultures encourage avoiding conflict and preserving relationships, people are less 
likely to get divorced. Examining data on farming and marital status in China from 1996 to 2010, 
Talhelm et al. found that rice provinces have in fact lower divorce rates than wheat provinces. In 
1996, the divorce rate of wheat provinces was 50% higher than that of rice provinces, and despite 
the country-wide doubling of divorce rates over the past 15 years, the raw gap between the rates 
of rice and wheat regions remained mostly constant.  
 Patents. The number of successfully filed patents for inventions is another measure of 
analytic thinking, a trait associated with individualism. Research has shown that analytic thinkers 
are more creative and thus better at coming up with novel uses for ordinary objects.34 A prior 
study conducted in the United States found that immigrants from individualistic cultures hold 
more patents for inventions than those from collectivistic cultures. After controlling for GDP per 
capita, Talhelm et al. found that up until 2010, wheat provinces generated about 30% more 
patents for inventions than rice provinces, corroborating the prior study’s findings.  
                                                     
33 Lester, “Individualism and Divorce.” Psychological Reports, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 258 (1995).  
34 Witkin et al., “Field-Dependent and Field-Independent Cognitive Styles and Their Educational Implications.” 
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 Additional analyses of divorce rates and patents for inventions show that rice provinces 
exhibit more markers of “East Asian” culture, specifically holistic thought, interdependent self-
construal, loyalty/nepotism, and lower rates of divorces and patents. On the other hand, wheat 
provinces seem to possess more features of traditional, “Western” culture, such as analytic 
thought, individualism, higher divorce rates, and innovation.   
 Modern Day Effects. An interesting observation is that Rice Theory of Culture, which is 
rooted in the agricultural practices of the past, impacts individuals and communities who no 
longer rely on those subsistence styles. With technological innovations in global food production 
and delivery, the six regions represented in the study are not the same farming villages, if they 
farm at all, as those mentioned in the farming guides in pre-modern China. Especially 
considering that the participants who confirmed differences in rice and wheat provinces were 
mainly students in their early 20s, a question emerges: How is the cultural orientation of 
individualism or collectivism in a region preserved and perpetuated even after the supposed 
reason for the distinction – namely the regional subsistence style – disappears? It appears that 
certain aspects of cultures get passed down from generation to generation, but what are the 
mechanisms by which this happens? This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2 Evaluation of Rice Theory and Alternative Theories  
 Strengths of Rice Theory. Talhelm et al.’s research addresses a common criticism of 
many cross-cultural studies that treat farming and herding as exhaustive and exclusive styles of 
subsistence that can be simply attributed to the East and the West, respectively. Though herding 
was certainly common in Western regions such as parts of Scotland and Switzerland, there also 
farming communities in the West. Similarly, herding existed in Eastern cultures as well. This 
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gave the scientific community reason to reexamine the traditional categorizations of herding and 
farming and differentiate types in both. Upon discovering that farming regions in the West 
mainly grew wheat and other similarly labor intensive crops such as barley whereas farms in the 
East tended to grow rice, Talhelm et al. sought to reframe the source of the East-West cultural 
dichotomy from farming-herding to rice-wheat. 
 An additional strength of the Rice Theory is the study’s methodology. It limited the 
number of confounding variables such as religion, government, and language that are typically 
inescapable in cross-cultural studies that span continents. Specifically, the study included six 
sites within mainland China and all participants were of Han descent. As briefly mentioned, it 
also tested neighboring regions along the rice-wheat border to control for confounds like climate. 
China was a preferable sample to Europe or Sub-Saharan Africa for testing the Rice Theory of 
Culture because the Han Chinese are more ethnically and politically unified and have a long, 
documented history of growing both rice and wheat. To that end, Han participants from Tibet, 
inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang were excluded because they are historically herding cultures with 
different languages and customs.  
 Critiques and Limitations. As acknowledged by the researchers themselves, the Rice 
Theory has much potential for further development or discrediting. It remains unclear whether 
reliance on an irrigation network is essential to cultivating a collectivistic culture, specifically if 
cultures that farm rice on drylands without the need for irrigation will exhibit similar markers of 
collectivism. It is also possible to question the appropriateness of the triad task, sociogram task, 
and business deal task as reliable measures of cultural thought style, implicit individualism, and 
loyalty/nepotism. Many researchers can and have operationalized these traits differently, beyond 
the three tasks described in this thesis. Another potential criticism is whether the above traits are 
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true and accurate markers of individualism and collectivism; for example, loyalty/nepotism may 
not be a manifestation of collectivism but rather an indicator of corrupt and less developed 
societies. Given the multilayered, dynamic, and largely unobservable nature of culture, it is 
difficult to definitively and comprehensively analyze cultural orientations. 
Modernization Hypothesis. Modernization Hypothesis argues that as societies become 
wealthier, more educated, and capitalist, they become more individualistic and analytical. 
Modernization is defined as the movement from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft because 
Gemeinschaft communities predated Gesellschaft societies historically. Many researchers have 
articulated specific psychological and societal mechanisms through which regional affluence, 
defined as GDP per capita, might lead to higher individualism.35 If higher rates of divorce and 
patents are indicative of individualistic cultures, then according to Modernization Theory, 
wealthier regions should have more divorces and patents. This prediction was supported by the 
data collected on the rice and wheat provinces in China.36   
However, the theory cannot explain the persistently collectivistic cultures of Japan, 
Korea, Hong Kong, and some provinces in China despite their immense growth in GDP per 
capita in recent history. The GDP of Guangdong is 3.5 times that of Guizhou, yet people in 
Guangdong actually thought more holistically, did not self-inflate in the sociogram task, and 
were not more likely to show loyalty/nepotism in the business deal task.37 
 Pathogen Prevalence Theory. Pathogen Prevalence Theory argues that regions that have 
historically had high prevalence of communicable diseases in the local ecology are more 
collectivistic, promoting behavioral manifestations of collectivism such as ethnocentrism and 
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37 Talhelm et al., “Large-Scale Psychological Differences Within China Explained by Rice Versus Wheat 
Agriculture.” 
 26 
 
conformity which help lower the risk of pathogen transmission.38 The logical basis of this theory 
is that pathogenic diseases impose selection pressures on the social behavior of host populations 
and interacting with strangers increases the risk of exposure to novel pathogens. Thus, high 
pathogen prevalence in a region encourages its members to draw a sharp distinction between 
coalitional in-groups and out-groups, a defining feature of collectivism, as part of anti-pathogen 
defense.39 In these regions, it is more dangerous to have higher tolerance for deviation from the 
status quo and to hold a weaker in-group/out-group distinction, traits that characterize 
individualistic societies.40  
From analyzing epidemiological data and worldwide cross-national surveys of 
individualism and collectivism, researchers found that regional prevalence of pathogens strongly 
positively correlates with cultural indicators of collectivism and negatively correlates with those 
of individualism. The findings suggest that pathogen prevalence may also predict additional 
cross-cultural differences such as preference for political conservatism, extended nepotism, and 
in-group care more generally, but rigorous empirical tests for these variables have yet to be 
conducted.41  
 Pathogen Prevalence Theory predicts southwestern China to be the most collectivistic 
given it has historically had the highest mortality rate from infectious diseases.42  Talhelm et al. 
conducted the triad task and found that provinces with higher disease rates actually think less 
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holistically, and this negative correlation held even when researchers tested the Pathogen Theory 
more precisely by comparing province-specific data on disease prevalence over time, starting in 
1976. The theory also failed to predict the results of the sociogram task, used to measure implicit 
individualism, as well as the findings from the business deal task, used to measure 
loyalty/nepotism. Additionally, regions with higher pathogen prevalence did not have lower rates 
of divorce or patents. Therefore, at least for the markers of collectivism and individualism tested 
in the Rice Theory, Pathogen Prevalence Theory did not fit the data. 
 Social Orientation Hypothesis. Social Orientation Hypothesis argues that differences such 
as genetics and linguistic origins cannot be ruled out as potential explanations for the differences 
between individualistic and collectivistic cultures.43 For example, Western languages are almost 
all Indo-European in origin and differ in many systematic ways from the major languages of East 
Asia. There are also clear and large differences in genetic makeup of the two regions, though of 
course that is true within each region as well. Generally speaking, religious roots in East Asia 
can be traced to Confucian values and ways of thought, whereas those in Europe are based on 
ancient Greek, notably Aristotelian, teachings.44 To be clear, this hypothesis does not refute the 
causal potential of subsistence styles but rather suggests that a multitude of other factors may 
contribute to cultural differences. In fact, this hypothesis cautions against drawing strong causal 
conclusions about any one factor – subsistence style or not - given that there remains a lot of 
speculation regarding the construction and transformation of culture. 
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2.3 Culture of Honor Theory: Legacy of Violence Rooted in Pastoralism 
Psychologists Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen examined the relationship between the 
past herding practice of the American South and higher levels of violence found in the region.45 
Pastoralism refers to the subsistence style of herding, which has been primarily contrasted with 
the agricultural style of farming in much of past cross-cultural research. Nisbett and Cohen relied 
on a variety of measurements and resources, including field observation, laboratory experiment, 
and analysis of historical data, to determine the existence of and possible reasons for this 
Southern phenomenon, termed the “Culture of Honor.”46  
 The theory of Southern Culture of Honor posits that aggression is a defense mechanism 
that developed from the historical subsistence style of herding in the American South. The 
logical basis is that when resources are limited and subject to theft, such as animals in a herd, 
there is greater need for protection, which can take the form of a herder’s reputation for 
toughness. Thus, herdsmen tended to be more aggressive and violent due to their vulnerability of 
losing their primary resources, and they comprised of the majority of the settlers in the South 
who immigrated from the fringes of Britain. “Honor” in the context of this theory does not refer 
to probity of character but rather to status and power – credible power of deterrence, achieved by 
projecting a stance of willingness to commit mayhem, even at the risk of harming oneself.47 
People in this culture cannot allow or forgive transgressions such as insults because that would 
give off the impression that they lack the strength to protect their property, people, and honor. 
 Analysis of correspondences, autobiographies, and newspapers in the South from the 
18th century onwards reveals that duels, feuds, lynchings, and bushwhackings among other 
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violent incidents occurred more frequently in the South than in the North.48 One account of the 
homicide rate in the plateau region of the Cumberland Mountains between 1865 and 1915 reports 
130 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, 26 times the 2013 U.S. national average of five murders 
per 100,000 inhabitants.49 To this today, the South maintains a version of its Culture of Honor 
despite the decline of herding since the 19th century when the cotton gin emerged as a viable 
alternative. Nisbett and Cohen propose several hypotheses to explain the relationship between 
herding and violence.  
Vulnerability to Loss. Honor-based cultures develop in response to economic 
precariousness and minimal state protection against theft of property, conferring economic value 
upon aggression and readiness to act violently.50 Both elements were present in the American 
South: for its herdsmen population, losing their herd equated to losing their entire wealth and 
livelihood, and the state held little power to enforce laws and protect them in this initially low-
population frontier region. This gave Southerners more leeway as well as the need to create their 
own system of order, leading to the more aggressive methods of deterrence and punishment in 
the South. On the other hand, they hypothesize that a similar Culture of Honor did not develop in 
the North because it was settled by European farmers whose primary resources – crops of land – 
were physically more secure and depended on cooperation for labor intensive processes. 
To be clear, Nisbett and Cohen do not believe that the absence of strong state presence 
was the main driver of aggression in cultures of honor; rather, it helped to preserve them by 
enabling people to commit violence with impunity. There are hunting-gathering cultures and 
farming cultures in areas with weak state presence that have low levels of violence, simply 
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because there is not as great a need for a reputation of physical strength.51 Instead, they claim 
aggression is a direct response to the vulnerable nature of herding, a claim that has been 
supported by anthropologists’ findings that herding cultures outside of the American South, such 
as faraway ones in the Middle East and Africa, exhibit similar concerns about honor and 
readiness to show strength.52 
Sensitivity to Insults. Herders vigilantly guard their reputation of strength by retaliating 
against any hint of an insult which might suggest that they are incapable of defending their 
property. An ethnographic study found that early in his career, a herder may deliberately pick 
fights in public to project an image of courage and strength.53 Personal insults such as a wife’s 
infidelity or verbal ridicule constitute violations of honor and warrant violence. Until the mid-
1970s, Texas law held that if a man caught his wife and her lover in a “compromising position” 
and killed them, no crime had been committed. When a man from Louisiana was on trial in 1930 
for shooting three men at a gas station for teasing him, all but one juror claimed that the man was 
innocent: “He ain’t guilty. He wouldn’t of been much of a man if he hadn’t shot them fellows.”54  
Uses of Warfare. Herding is common in ecologies such as mountains, semi-deserts, and 
steppes where crop farming is unlikely to yield enough food for survival. Limited to this 
subsistence style, herders have little surplus of food which not only increases the economic 
precariousness described above but also makes stealing others’ herds more tempting. 
Consequently, theft and raiding are endemic in pastoral populations, wherein skill at warfare 
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often determined herders’ chances of survival and success.55 This may explain why herding 
populations of Europe are reputed to have been the best soldiers over the centuries. 
 To test the above hypotheses, Nisbett and Cohen looked at contemporary regional 
differences in homicide rates, attitudes towards violence, and reactions to insults.  
 Homicide Rates. After isolating the U.S. Department of Justice data on homicide to look 
at Southern, white, non-Hispanic, male offenders, the researchers’ analysis supported the 
Southern Culture of Honor Theory. Non-Caucasians were factored out due to their later arrival 
and inferior status in the South’s early history which exempt them from the effects of the 
historical herding culture. Women were factored out because the D.O.J. only reported data on 
male offenders from 1976-1983. With the exception of the largest cities (over 200,000 in 
population), the South has the highest homicide rate out of all regions in the U.S.56  
 To link homicide rates more directly to herding-based Culture of Honor Theory, 
psychologist Andrew Reaves examined contemporary homicide rates of various regions within 
the South.57 Moist plains allow for farming and cash crops while dry plains are more suitable for 
herding. He found that homicide rates in dry plains are indeed substantially higher than in 
farming regions. Furthermore, from analyzing 1987 data on the types of homicides, Nisbett and 
Cohen found that argument-related murders – brawls, lovers’ triangles, or verbal spats – 
occurred much more frequently than felony-related murders – robbery or burglary.58 For felony-
related murders, the South’s homicide rate was similar to that of non-Southern regions, further 
supporting the claim that the South is particularly approving of violent responses to insults. 
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 Attitudes toward Violence. When surveyed on general violence and specific violence 
unrelated to honor or self-protection, Southerners did not differ significantly from non-
Southerners in their responses. If anything, Southerners were more opposed to above types of 
violence than non-Southerners – between hurting people or damaging property, Southerners were 
more likely than non-Southerners to say hurting people was worse.59 However, the responses 
changed completely when asked about using lethal violence for self-protection, namely for 
protecting oneself, one’s family, and one’s home. Southerners were significantly more likely to 
agree that killing the perpetrator in the above circumstances is justified, and in the case of killing 
someone to defend one’s home, the percentage of Southerners who agreed was roughly double 
that of non-Southerners.60 This result is interesting given that in the abstract, Southerners 
believed that harming people was worse than damaging another’s property. Therefore, while 
Southerners may not endorse general or even specific but abstract violence particularly more 
than non-Southerners, they were much more likely to endorse lethal violence in specific, 
personal, honor-related circumstances.        
 In a survey of rural countries in the South and the Midwest, which is most similar to the 
South in terms of ecology and economy, respondents were given a series of scenarios involving 
personal affronts a hypothetical character named Fred. In three of them, the question asked how 
justified it would be for Fred to fight an acquaintance who had affronted him – either by looking 
at and talking suggestively to his girlfriend, insulting his wife by implying she had loose morals, 
or telling others that he is a liar and a cheat. Two scenarios included more serious affronts – 
sexually assaulting his teenage daughter and stealing his wife – and the researchers asked how 
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justified Fred would be in shooting the perpetrator.61 On average, Southerners were more likely 
than Midwesterners to see strong justification for Fred taking violent action in response to these 
affronts. The difference in responses was a particularly dramatic on the sexual assault of the 
daughter question, with almost half of Southerners responding that the shooting would be 
“extremely justified” compared to only a quarter of Midwesterners. These findings affirm the 
existence of a Culture of Honor in the South, wherein violence is considered an acceptable tool 
for dealing with honor-related matters.      
 Reactions to Insults. Social psychologists have shown that there can be large gaps 
between expressed attitudes and actual behavior; thus, further research is warranted to determine 
whether or not Southern ideology of violence actually translates to behavior. Nisbett and Cohen 
conducted experiments in which Southerners and Northerners were rudely insulted and 
compared based on their reactions. They observed the participants’ emotional reactions, 
physiological responses, and actions in response to the insults and found that Southern 
participants responded differently than Northern participants. 
 Emotionally, compared to Northerners, Southerners were more likely to be angry and less 
amused by an insult because they see insult as cause for anger. Physiologically, insulted 
Southerners exhibited large increases in cortisol levels – a hormone associated with stress, 
anxiety, and arousal – whereas Southerners and Northerners in control groups did not. 
Behaviorally, compared to control groups and insulted Northerners, insulted Southerners went 
much further in the “chicken game” wherein participants had to decide when to “chicken out” 
and give way to the confederate walking determinedly down a narrow hall where only one 
person could pass without the other swerving.  
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Findings from the research of Nisbett and Cohen support the Culture of Honor Theory in 
the South as well as in other traditional, herding-based cultures around the world. Similar to how 
Talhelm et al. compared neighboring Chinese provinces to control for confounding variables, 
Nisbett and Cohen also examined prior studies on neighboring communities with similar 
ecologies who differ only in subsistence style. Anthropologist Robert Edgerton found that two 
neighboring tribes in East Africa, one of herders and the other of farmers, have opposite attitudes 
towards toughness, violence, and warfare. The herding tribe values expressions of machismo, 
whereas the farming tribe displays an insistent desire to get along with each other.62  
  
2.4 Evaluation of Culture of Honor Theory and Alternative Theories  
 Strength of Culture of Honor Theory. Nisbett and Cohen combine research techniques 
from various disciplines – history, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and ethnology – in an 
attempt to address concerns over methodologies commonly used in cultural psychology and to 
gather more reliable data. To analyze the existence, extent, and cause of the Southern Culture of 
Honor, they look at prior research of ethnographers, psychometricians, cliometricians (involving 
quantitative and archival studies of history and social institutions), survey sociologists, and 
experimental social psychologist.63 This panoply of methods strengthens their case for the 
Culture of Honor and its origin in the traditional, herding subsistence style.  
  Nisbett and Cohen also pay special attention to potential confounds and control for 
regional differences in age, education, race, and income when studying the Southern ideology of 
selective, honor-based violence. Since regional disparity in homicide rates, attitudes towards 
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violence, and reactions to insults remained statistically significant over time, the aggression 
cannot be simply attributed to structural or demographic changes in one community or region. 
 The bulk of the data – archival, survey, experimental, and field – overwhelmingly support 
the finding that insults are taken much more seriously by Southerners because personal affronts 
are perceived as threats to their honor. If left unpunished, insults can damage reputations and 
imply weakness, so affronted Southerners must respond with aggression to reestablish their 
reputation. The Culture of Honor is reflected in not only the individual behavior of Southerners, 
but also in the contemporary public policies and social institutions of the South, further affirming 
the pervasiveness and persistence of the honor-based culture.  
 Critiques and Limitations. Despite the multitude of research techniques used, some 
scholars might find the Nisbett and Cohen’s reliance on social science experiments and findings 
unconvincing. Surveys and field experiments, no matter how carefully controlled, do not always 
yield the most accurate or representative results. A similar issue exists even in a laboratory 
setting, as researchers often struggle to find truly representative, untainted samples. For example, 
in an experiment intended to compare Southerners and Northerners based on their reactions to 
insults, the sample was not representative of the two regions broadly, let alone of even the white, 
non-Hispanic, non-Jewish, and male demographic the researchers intended to study. They were 
all students at the University of Michigan who were classified as “Southerner” or “Northerner” 
based only on their self-identified hometowns, leading them to vary on multiple dimensions that 
could have compromised the validity of the findings.64  
 This methodological limitation is in large part due to the nature of cultural psychology, in 
which phenomena are difficult to definitively and comprehensively explain. Even the best-
considered assertions of researchers can be challenged as mistaken subjective interpretations 
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with scientific evidence to back up the rejection. Quantitative social scientists also face this 
problem since many have found conflicting evidence for the existence of the Southern Culture of 
Honor. Some believe, from their research, that the South does not use or condone violence 
particularly more than other regions in the U.S. Admittedly, none of the lab experiments 
discussed actually produced violent behavior; therefore, it is indeed an extrapolation to claim that 
Southerners are violent when their honor is insulted, even if the regional penchant for aggression 
has been proven. 
Higher Temperature. Some scholars have suggested that higher temperatures may be the 
cause of greater violence in the South. The underlying logic is that higher temperature causes 
tempers to flare, which subsequently leads to more aggressive behavior.65 There is supporting 
evidence to this hypothesis – some research show that both lethal and nonlethal violent crimes 
are more likely to occur on hot days.66 However, this alternative theory does not hold up when 
crime data is disaggregated by region and city size. Though villages in Georgia indeed have 
higher homicide rates than those in Massachusetts, there is little difference between the major 
cities in both states despite the significant temperature difference.67 Additionally, Nisbett and 
Reaves’ analysis of homicide rates per July temperature showed that dry plains, where homicide 
rates are highest, are actually cooler than moist plains. In other words, the pattern of homicide 
rates observed in the South contradicts the temperature hypothesis.  
 Tradition of Slavery. For a long time, slavery has been considered the primary cause of 
greater violence in the South.68 It has been argued that whites used corporal punishment to 
control their slaves and that this violent behavior spread among whites in the environment. 
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Revolutionary John Dickinson concurred, stating that the institution of slavery led to Southern 
“pride, selfishness, peevishness, violence,” Abigail Adams believed that whites inflicted on 
themselves on the same kind of violence that they accorded their slaves, an opinion shared by 
Thomas Jefferson.69 Nisbett and Cohen’s findings support the conjecture that Southerners use 
violence as a means of achieving social control, whether it be disciplining slaves, spanking 
children, or executing criminals.70 Thus, the violent legacy of slavery remains a plausible part of 
the explanation for Southern attitudes and behaviors relating to violence. However, it alone 
cannot entirely explain greater violence in the South. Nisbett and Reaves’ analysis of homicide 
rate per percent of population enslaved in 1860 showed that most plains regions where slavery 
was common have the lowest homicide rates, compared to the violent dry plains where slavery 
was less common. The hypothesis also fails to explain why the Midwest, which has no history of 
slavery, has a similarly high homicide rate.  
 Greater Poverty. As a whole, the South is historically poorer than any other region of the 
U.S., and data on every region and population unit in the U.S. corroborate the positive 
correlation between poverty and homicide rates.71 Nisbett and Reaves’ analysis of homicide rate 
per capita income showed that poverty is a conceivable explanation of higher homicide rate, 
though regional differences between dry plains and moist plains are small. However, upon 
further examination, it cannot adequately explain the Culture of Honor. Equally poor Northern 
and Southern villages displayed significant disparity in homicide rates and the disparity in 
homicide rates between major Northern and Southern cities actually increased after poverty was 
controlled for in the analyses.72  
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN SHAPING MORALITY 
 
 The continued and selective perpetuation of regional collectivism and individualism in 
the absence of its presumed source – the subsistence style – suggests an interesting link between 
historical practices and contemporary cultures. In the case of the Chinese provinces, neighboring 
towns that differed primarily in their subsistence style decades and centuries ago still exhibit 
contrasting characteristics of collectivism and individualism. Though the lawless frontier and 
herding economy no longer characterize the American South, the honor-based attitude and use of 
violence forged during the seventeenth century have persevered, largely due to the South’s harsh 
socialization process.  
 The goal of this chapter is twofold – first, to explore a few mechanisms by which these 
cultural orientations and norms persist; second, to discuss their implications on regional moral 
norms and attitudes, specifically in the realm of human rights.  
 
3.1 Mechanisms of Norm Persistence 
Socialization. Greenfield’s theory of social change, detailed in Chapter 1, views 
sociodemographic changes as the primary driver of cultural change. Over time, the environment 
of a region transforms, generally towards Gesellschaft.73 Qualities, skills, and social relations 
adapt to environmental changes, and children receive socialization messages from their parents 
and various stimuli in their environment. For example, a 2005 study found that American 
mothers generally perceived their children’s self-esteem to be much more important than did 
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grandmothers, a change which coincided with U.S. becoming more Gesellschaft over the past 
few decades.74  
Despite the dynamic nature of culture, some values are resistant to change even when the 
sociodemographics evolve and newer generations experience a different environment than that of 
their parents. A 2000 study found that U.S.-born Mexican teenagers from immigrant families 
endorsed family obligation values just as strongly as Mexican adolescents born in Mexico, 
despite the more Gesellschaft environment of the U.S.75   
 Similarly, socialization plays a major role in the generational perpetuation of the 
Southern Culture of Honor. Nisbett and Cohen found that Southern women and men hold similar 
attitudes towards violence, and women actively participate in teaching ideas of honor to their 
sons and enforcing the notions upon their husbands. As mothers and wives, Southern women 
perpetuate a culture in which boys are groomed for violence through a harsh socialization 
process designed to make them physically courageous and ferocious in defense of their 
reputations. Even very young children are encouraged to be aggressive and abide by the code of 
honor – for example, a boy who would dodge a stone rather than allow himself to be hit and then 
respond in kind would be ostracized by his fellows.76  
 In the collectivistic rice villages discussed in Chapter 2, children are socialized to engage 
in cooperative behavior given its essentiality to the labor-intensive subsistence style of rice 
farming. In these communities, cooperative behavior had practical benefits, and individuals who 
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successfully passed on such social qualities to the next generation improved the survival chances 
of their offspring.77 
 Collective Expressions. Collective expressions of culture, such as social policies and 
laws, can determine whether or not cultural values are manifested in aggregate, institutional-level 
processes. If values of honor and aggression are indeed encoded in the laws, policies, media 
representations, and institutional behavior of the South then it is possible to claim that Southern 
culture as a whole is more violent than Northern culture in honor-related circumstances. The 
following implication is that aggressive attitudes and behaviors transcend individuals in the 
South and exist as part of a larger phenomenon that persists across generations.  
 Law and social policy shape the behavior of citizens by defining what is acceptable, 
appropriate, worthy of reward, and worthy of punishment. Consequently, they affect individual 
behavior and attitudes, in both visible and invisible ways. For example, loose gun control laws 
reinforce as well as reflect the lawless frontier mentality, capital punishment laws and customs 
legitimize retributive feelings, corporal punishment laws convey ideas about appropriate 
methods for socializing children and dealing with disorder, and media portrayals of violence as a 
justified tool promote its usage.78 Death penalty exists in many states, both Northern and 
Southern, but mainly those in the South have the means and desire to actually execute prisoners 
on death row – between 1977 to 1991, 140 out of 157 executions occurred in the South, 
affirming its elevated tolerance of violent attitudes and behaviors.79 This feedback loop between 
individual- and collective-level behaviors perpetuate the norms around violence and honor in the 
South. In this model, individual behavior and private representations, occurring in an 
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institutional context, reinforce public representations of what is right, good, and appropriate, 
which future generations will uphold.80  
 
 
3.2 Culture to Morality 
More than a century ago, sociologist Emile Durkheim argued that moral choices, small 
and big, are influenced by the culture of the decision-maker: 
[E]ven the moralist who believes he is able, by the power of 
thought, to withdraw himself from the influences of surrounding 
ideas, cannot succeed in doing so. For he is entirely permeated by 
them, and, whatever he does, it is they that he discovers once more 
at the conclusion of his deductions.81 
Therefore, morality forms in the context of social interactions which are largely shaped 
by culture. In 1990, cultural anthropologist Richard Shweder proposed a model of understanding 
the interaction between culture and morality – a tripartite distinction between Ethics of 
Autonomy, Community, and Divinity which takes into account the highly diverse moral nuances 
and considerations of cultures around the world.82 Research shows the presence of all three 
ethics in diverse cultures, meaning that cultures are usually rarely only autonomy-, community-, 
or divinity-oriented. Recognizing this, Shweder assessed participants based on the degree to 
which they exhibited markers of the three Ethics, rather than classifying people as purely one 
type. This echoes the aforementioned claim that no culture is purely individualistic or 
collectivistic, and as such, individuals’ moral attitudes and behaviors must also be theorized 
more holistically. Shweder’s Ethic of Autonomy and the Ethic of Community are relevant to this 
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thesis because they correspond to cultural orientations of individualism and collectivism, 
respectively, thereby linking cultural orientations and conceptions of morality.  
Ethic of Autonomy. The Ethic of Autonomy involves a focus on people as individuals 
who have needs, desires, and preferences. The moral goal supported by this Ethic is to recognize 
the right to the fulfilment of these needs and desires and to strive to provide the means to satisfy 
them.83 While the rights, interests, and well-being of the individual are emphasized, this Ethic 
also highlights the need to act with consideration of the needs and rights of others and to take 
responsibility for oneself. Naturally, this Ethic inspires autonomy-oriented virtues such as self-
esteem, self-expression, and independence.  
 Ethic of Community. Shweder’s Ethic of Community shifts the focus from the individual 
to the community, such as family, school, and nation. Individuals exist and function in this social 
context and in relation to others. From this perspective, a person’s moral goal is to fulfill role-
based duties to others and to contribute to the protection and positive functioning of one’s social 
group. Consequently, this Ethic is concerned with the customs, interests, and welfare – the 
culture – of groups and values community-oriented virtues such as self-moderation, loyalty, and 
collaboration. 
 Therefore, people living in individualistic societies adopt the moral discourse of 
autonomy in that what is considered right or wrong depends on whether it affects one’s rights or 
not. In contrast, collectivistic societies endorse a moral discourse of community, wherein people 
perceive themselves as interconnected with their social group and judge right and wrong on the 
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basis of interpersonal duties, social roles, and obligations.84 Even so, it remains unclear how 
autonomy-oriented and community-oriented virtues actually materialize as specific moral norms. 
In response, this thesis will examine how the two culture-based Ethics unfold with regards to 
human rights, a particular category of moral norms. 
 
3.3 Culturally-Divided Rights: Economic, Social, Cultural vs. Civil and Political  
After the Second World War, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which consists of 30 articles affirming the 
rights of individuals. Though UDHR has been considered a modern standard of international 
human rights for about seventy years, the document was non-binding and aspirational. When the 
international community convened to transform human rights principles into legally binding 
obligations, the ideological division between the East and West surfaced. The two Blocs insisted 
on rights focusing on different sets of issues, and tensions deepened against the backdrop of the 
Cold War.85  
The failure to transform the UDHR into a single binding instrument led the UN bodies to 
facilitate the negotiation and adoption of two separate Covenants in 1966 – the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Distinguishing between economic, social, and cultural rights 
(ESCR) and civil and political rights (CPR) reified the existence of separate, distinct categories 
of human rights. In doing so, ESCR and CPR were pitted against each other in terms of relative 
legitimacy, universality, and prioritization of enforcement. Though the 1993 Vienna Declaration 
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sought to undo the separation of rights and restore the UDHR’s stance of undistinguished and 
therefore equally important rights, the political, conceptual, and institutional divide between 
ESCR and CPR persists. 
Much like during the time of their adoption, Eastern, developing, and/or collectivistic 
countries prioritize ESCR while Western, developed, and/or individualistic countries continue to 
put greater emphasis on CPR. Differential support for types of rights appears to rise from 
variations in cultural values.86 According to the Council on Foreign Relations, which published 
in 2011 Public Opinion on Global Issues, a comprehensive summary of polling data on global 
public attitudes on many major issues, U.S. respondents supported the right to express any 
opinion far more than the international average (76% vs. 66% said the right is “very 
important”).87 These results are in keeping with the traditional U.S. emphasis on political 
freedoms and individualism. On the other hand, only 34% of respondents from Russia believed it 
was “very important,” which is unsurprising given Russia is often associated with collectivism 
and has been historically considered an anchor point in the individualism-collectivism spectrum, 
opposite the U.S.  
Expectedly, these differences in support between U.S. and Russian citizens follow a 
similar trend for other issues of CPR – on the freedom of the press from government 
interference, 75% of Americans agreed as opposed to 45% of Russians; on the right to 
demonstrate peacefully, 94% of Americans vs. 76% Russians; on the freedom of religion, 77% 
of Americans vs. 34% of Russians.88 For issues regarding ESCR, the trend is flipped – 
respondents from individualistic countries like the U.S. show far less support for these types of 
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rights, including rights to social welfare, food supply programs, healthcare, and employment, 
whereas those from collectivistic countries like Russia show far more support than the 
international average.  
 As per the discussion on norm persistence, these regional differences in support for 
certain types of rights are not a new phenomenon. In a 1998 study, European university students 
were asked to rate the importance of certain human rights. 99% of students in Yugoslavia, then a 
socialist country, rated the right of protection from unemployment “very important” compared to 
just 22% of their Western counterparts, namely students from Germany, Finland, and Norway.89 
When asked about the right to seek asylum, a political issue, the results flipped, with 37% of 
Yugoslavian students considering it to be “very important” vs. 73% of Western students.  
 As previously mentioned, attitude – especially when self-reported – does not necessarily 
translate to behavior. Self-rated agreement with human rights statements such as “Everyone has 
the right to freedom of opinion” may reflect only a superficial endorsement of a moral value 
rather than a true commitment. A 1971 study on tolerance for dissent conducted by psychologists 
Gail Zellman and David Sears found that 60% of the sample of American youth claimed “I 
believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be,” but when asked later if a 
Communist should be allowed to speak in their city, only 21% agreed.90 Therefore, while self-
rated data reveal strong adherence to cultural norms – certainly important evidence of culture’s 
influence on morality – it may not be as meaningful or reliable as one would expect.  
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3.4 A Potential Explanation: Individual vs. individual 
 Western modernity regards the “Individual” as the bedrock social actor from which all 
other higher-order units are constituted through associational activity.91 Given that the language 
of human rights emerged from Western liberal tradition, it is not surprising then that 85% of all 
rights provisions enumerated in international human rights instruments pertain to individuated 
entities as opposed to groups.92 In fact, some scholars have argued that human rights are 
inherently individualistic because they refer to rights held by individuals in relation to and 
sometimes even against the state and society.93 However, what it means to be an individual 
varies across cultures and over time. In some cultures, individuals are understood as brute, social 
facts, akin to discrete members of the human species.94 In others, they are considered 
autonomous and empowered social agents.    
 The conception of the Individual – with a capital “I” – is the product of long-term cultural 
construction and evolution in the West.95 The Individual is a self-determining actor with intrinsic 
rights. From this perspective, the Individual is an ontological and cosmological artifact rather 
than a mere biological entity.96 Though much of human rights literature has adopted this view of 
the Individual, interpretation and practice of human rights vary greatly across cultures. Non-
Western societies lack the deep tradition of autonomous individualism that characterizes much of 
the West – in some societies, the conception of an abstract individual who exists and has value 
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independent of particular social contexts is nonexistent.97 In such cultures, individuals – with a 
lower-case “i” – have status and standing only by virtue of their membership in various groups.  
 The culturally-variant notions of the Individual and the individual correspond to those of 
individualism and collectivism, respectively. This association is further supported by social 
psychologist Geert Hofstede who found that the Individualist ideology was indeed strongest in 
Western Protestant countries and weakest in Animist and Confucian countries in East Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa.98 In African philosophy, French philosopher René Descartes’ famous 
dictum “I think, therefore I am” is translated to “I am because we are, and because we are 
therefore I am.”99  
The empirical implication of the distinction between the ontological Individual and the 
biological individual is that rights which empower the Individual are more respected and 
supported in Western cultures and less so in Eastern and Sub-Saharan African cultures. These 
rights, considered to have been derived from Western values of liberty and equality, are best 
embodied in CPR. Thus, CPR issues continue to be at the forefront of many Western states’ 
efforts to advance human rights. For example, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
– two of the biggest and most prominent human rights organizations globally – were founded in 
the West and remain largely Western in ideology and staff demographics. Perhaps as a 
consequence, both of their initial mandates focused on advancing CPR, and while they have 
since expanded their mandate in scope and reach, CPR issues arguably still take priority over 
ESCR in terms of funding, programming, and raising awareness.100  
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On the other hand, non-Western cultures are generally more concerned than Western 
cultures about threats to their biological well-being such as practices of torture and poverty.101 At 
the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, many Asian and African governments 
sought to redefine human rights away from CPR.102 Some even claimed that protecting CPR was 
detrimental to achieving peace, order, and development of countries, for individualism fosters 
disorder and chaos whereas collectivism fosters harmony and progress. Therefore, without 
bridging the cultural construals of the Individual and the individual, support and respect for 
specific human rights will likely remain deeply divided based on cultural orientations.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis connects theories and concepts from cultural psychology and moral 
psychology to propose an interesting perspective on the roots of cultural variation in moral 
attitudes and norms, including those of human rights. The first chapter gave an overview of 
cultural psychology and set the stage for subsequent discussions on how and why cultures vary. 
Specifically, they were categorized by orientation, as primarily collectivistic or individualistic. 
For the remainder of the thesis, different origins and spin-offs of the two were discussed – 
Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, interdependence-independence, farming-herding, rice-wheat, Ethic 
of Community-Ethic of Autonomy, and ICESCR-ICCPR.  
Chapter 2 explored Subsistence Style Theory, a possible explanation for the persistence 
of cultural orientations, which argues that the particular social and economic systems created by 
a subsistence style can impact the culture at large and for generations. Two case studies – the 
Chinese provinces with agricultural legacies of rice and wheat and the American South with 
historical reliance on pastoralism – were elaborated upon to showcase the merits and weaknesses 
of Subsistence Style Theory.  
The insights and theories discussed in the first two chapters, albeit interesting, may leave 
the reader thinking: “so what?” Even if Subsistence Style Theory is widely accepted and we are 
indeed a product of our ancestors’ method of subsistence, how does that matter in the present 
day? The third and final chapter attempted to answer this question by exploring political, 
philosophical, and cultural ways in which these orientations, established historically and 
maintained generationally, impact today’s moral ideas and behaviors. In an effort to assess the 
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validity of a causal link between culture and morality, the chapter opened with a discussion on 
potential mechanisms of norm persistence. 
In particular, I focused on human rights as a key category of moral norms. The struggle to 
advance human rights requires the committed support of the world’s citizens and governments, 
so it follows that understanding why cultures vary in their respect and support for certain types of 
human rights is crucial to effectively advocate for these rights on a global scale. The fact that 
cultural orientations can explain at least partly the West’s prioritization of civil and political 
rights and the East’s of economic, social, and cultural rights can inform the strategies of 
advocates in their efforts to increase support for all rights for everyone.  
In keeping with the pattern of critically evaluating the theories put forth in the three 
chapters, I think it is only appropriate to end this thesis with questions and alternative 
considerations. First, it is worth considering if and how long the impact of historical subsistence 
style will last. To my knowledge, no study has explored this question in depth. At what point, 
under what catalyst, will a culture change so much that it no longer corresponds to the 
orientation promoted by its past subsistence style? Perhaps it is just a matter of time – given that 
cultures are constantly evolving, it may be the case that a culture’s orientation and defining 
characteristics will change simply after some number of years. Alternatively, they may last 
permanently, maintained by strong mechanisms such as child socialization and social policies. 
The bottom line is that no one knows, and it will be interesting to follow communities like the 
Chinese provinces and Southern towns discussed above to see if and how they change over time. 
 Areas of further study include extensions of Subsistence Style Theory, much like the 
Rice Theory, as well as research outside of subsistence style, perhaps on alternative explanations 
for the persistence of cultural orientations. These studies could strengthen or weaken Subsistence 
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Style Theory and its implications for contemporary cultures. Separately, scholars could research 
methods to induce greater support for human rights that are less respected in a particular culture 
– for example, how to foster supportive attitudes and behaviors towards economic rights in the 
U.S. While policy can certainly be an important piece of change, I am interested in exploring the 
possibility of a broader cultural shift that makes Americans more approving of economic rights. 
Perhaps the key is to figure out ways to make American culture more collectivistic, as studies 
have shown that collectivistic cultures place greater value on economic, social, and cultural 
rights than do individualistic cultures like the U.S.  
 By nature, the disciplines and topics discussed in this thesis are hard to definitively prove 
and claim. It is entirely possible that after reading this thesis, the reader will have questions 
beyond those I attempted to address in the evaluation sections. The reader may even completely 
disagree with some of the premises – for example, if he or she believes in cultural universalism – 
and challenge the entire logic of connecting cultural orientations, subsistence style, and morality. 
Consequently, as I mentioned in the Introduction, my goal is not to convince the reader that the 
theories and findings discussed in this thesis are absolutely true or form the only explanation for 
the phenomena described. Rather, I hope to introduce the reader to lesser-known theories of 
cultural change and provide a theoretical starting point for a broader, more complex discussion 
on what makes us who we are today.  
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